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I. INTRODUCTION 
This paper examines the practice of the New Zealand Income Support Service 
(NZISS) in relation to the exercise of discretion in assessing Special Benefit 
entitlement following the decision in Ankers v Attorney General. 1 
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To have discretion, in its broadest sense, is to be able to make decisions, or take 
particular courses of action, according to some degree of personal assessment and 
judgment. 
In the administrative law context, administrative discretion does not enable a 
decision-maker to take any course of action that s/he chooses, but rather to make a 
choice among possible courses of action or inaction. 2 Dworkin describes discretion 
as similar to a hole in a doughnut - discretion does not exist except as an area left 
open by the surrounding belt of restriction. 3 
With regard to Special Benefit the surrounding belt of restriction is provided by the 
Social Security Act 1964, by ministerial directions and by NZISS rules or policies. 
This paper will consider the extent to which NZISS practice has changed since 
Ankers and in response to the new ministerial direction. This will involve a discussion 
of the actions NZISS has taken to change their practice and suggested reasons for 
why change may not be as substantial as expected. The reasons examined include: 
the unworkability of the ministerial direction itself; the inadequacy ofNZISS actions; 
and the institutional barriers to effective exercise of discretion in an organisation such 
as NZISS . 
2 
3 
[ 1995) NZFLR 193 . 
Davis. KC Discretionary Justice : A preliminary inquiry (University of Illinois Press, 
Chicago, 1971) 14. 
Dworkin. R Taking Rights Seriously (Butterworths, London, 1977) 31 . 
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The wider question of the implications of a move towards greater discretion in the 
assessment of Special Benefit will be considered with a view to establishing whether it 
is 'a good thing' or whether greater reliance on rules would be a better option for 
NZISS . An attempt to strike the right balance between rules and discretion is made in 
a suggestion for some appropriate rules enabling better assessment of Special Benefit 
in the future . 
II. SPECIAL BENEFIT : THE LAW AND THE MINISTERIAL 
DIRECTIONS 
Special benefit is payable under section 61G of the Social Security Act 1964.4 The 
statute itself does not stipulate the eligibility criteria but rather provides that the 
Director-General may in his discretion, grant entitlement to a Special Benefit if 
"satisfied that, after taking into account all of that person's financial circumstances 
and commitments, . . . such a special entitlement is justified". 
The Director-General's discretion is guided by a series of ministerial directions 
pursuant to section 5(2) of the Social Security Act 1964 which requires the Director-
General to comply with any general or special directions given to the Director-
General by the Minister in writing. 
The directions stipulate that they are to be applied "without derogating from your 
duty to have regard to the particular financial circumstances and commitments of the 
applicant". 5 
4 See Appendix. 
Ministerial Direction Section 61 : Special Benefit, 1 April 1992 and 28 March 1995. See 
Appendix. 
L~, , I L. L .... · h 
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The directions outline some general principles and provide an "assessment 
procedure" which is essentially a formula calculated by: deducting the 
applicant's weekly allowable fixed costs6 from their weekly chargeable income;7 
then deducting the standard income costs figure8; then deducting $10.00. Any 
remaining deficit would then be payable as Special Benefit provided such deficit 
did not exceed 30% of the applicant's allowable fixed costs. 
EXAMPLE 
A single unemployment beneficiary with two dependent children, 
whose weekly chargeable income is $210.45 and whose weekly 
allowable costs are $94.30. 
Calculation 
Chargeable income 
less allowable costs 
Disposable income 
less standard costs 
Deficiency 
less deduction 
The difference a = 
b is 30% of allowable costs = 
210.45 
94.30 
116.15 
136.15 
(20.00) 
$10.00 
$10.00 
$28.29 
A special benefit of $10.00 a week is justified, subject to clauses 
8 and 9. 
The ministerial directions examined in the Ankers case provided for a deduction of 
$20.00 per week. In addition they provided that the requirement to deduct $20.00 
could be disregarded where there were special circumstances and the 30% of fixed 
costs limit could be exceeded where exceptional circumstances existed.9 Since 
Ankers, a new ministerial direction has been issued. 
6 
8 
9 
Cost determined by NZISS as essential which cannot be readily avoided or varied. 
Benefit rate plus part-time earnings, plus interest from savings, plus child support and so 
on. 
The proportion of living costs applicants "may be expected to meet from their benefits" - a 
figure determined by NZISS without any reference to the consumer price index or other 
objective criteria. This is a figure which has been criticised as long since outdated, see 
Evaluation Unit, Social Policy Agency, An Evaluation of the Special Needs Grants and 
Special Benefit Programmes, Wellington, 1993, 30. 
Above n 5, 1 April 1992. 
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The current ministerial direction specifies a deduction of $10. 00 per week instead of 
$20.00 per week. In addition, it simply states that the formula is subject to clauses 8 
and 9. Clause 8 provides that upon completion of the above formula calculation, the 
applicant can be granted a greater or lesser amount of special benefit if it is justified 
having regard to certain principles and other listed factors. 1° Clause 9 states that 
there is no requirement to grant a Special Benefit, or grant at a particular rate, if in 
the circumstances of the particular case it is determined that such grant should not be 
made.11 
III. ANKERS v ATTORNEY GENERAL 
Ankers v Attorney-General involved an application for review of the ministerial 
directions relating to the assessment of Special Benefits under the Social Security Act 
1964, and of the application of such directions by the Director-General Social 
Welfare (D-GSW) and his staff. 12 
A. Matters Leading up to Review Application 
10 
11 
12 
13 
In 1992 Ms Ankers and others applied to the Department's Auckland office 
for Special Benefits. Their applications were declined following a formula 
assessment of their entitlement. 
All four applicants applied for a Committee Review of the decisions with the 
aid of The Peoples Centre Inc - an advice and advocacy service for 
beneficiaries. The initial decisions were upheld . The applicants' subsequent 
appeal to the Social Security Appeal Authority was allowed in whole or in 
part.13 
Including special or unusual financial ex-penditure, special or unusual reasons for such 
expenditure, the causes of the applicant 's financial difficulty, and any other matters 
considered relevant. See ministerial direction in Appendix. 
Above n 5, 28 March 1995. 
Above n l , 195. 
Above n l. 202. 
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On advice that the Crown intended to challenge the Appeal Authority 
decision, Ms Ankers made an application for review to the High Court on her 
own behalf and (pursuant to Rule 78 of the High Court Rules) on behalf of all 
past and present Special Benefit applicants .14 
The grounds put forward by Ms Ankers were as follows: 
( 1) The ministerial directions were ultra-vires and illegal. 
(2) The ministerial directions were unreasonable. 
(3) The application and practice by the D-GSW of the ministerial 
directions was unlawful, unreasonable or unfair. 15 
B. The Findings 
14 
15 
16 
17 
Thorp J found against the first two grounds of review and upheld the third 
ground. Those findings that have some bearing on the issues discussed in this 
paper are set out below: 
(1) The ministerial directions were not invalid. 
(1 .1) "The use of a formula to promote consistency in the exercise of discretion 
does not derogate from the duty to have regard to the particular financial 
circumstances and commitments of the applicant, and is unobjectionable 
provided it is seen as a guide and not as a rule ... [and} provided it is 
subject to reconsideration in the light of the applicant 's overall 
circumstances. "16 
(1.2) The directions were not bad for ambiguity, uncertainty and vagueness. 
They were not so uncertain as to be unworkable.17 
Above n 1, 203 . 
Above n 1, 204. 
Above n 1, 206. 
Above n 1. 207. 
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(2) The Minister's directions were not unreasonable. It is up to the 
Minister, not the Court, to determine the priorities to be given to 
different social programmes. Measures to reduce 'fiscal blowout' 
were not contrary to the policy of the Act. 18 
(3 . 1) The application in practice by the D-GSW of the ministerial directions 
was unreasonable because in the majority of cases, first instance 
decisions were made without considering the possible existence of 
special or exceptional circumstances and principally by a mechanical 
application of the formula underlying the SWIFTT computer 
programme. 19 
(3 .2) NZISS practice breached the rules of natural justice and section 27 of 
the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 as applicants were not given 
a fair opportunity to place before the decision maker information 
relevant to his decision. 20 
IV. THE POST-ANKERS ERA : HAS NZISS PRACTICE 
CHANGED? 
Since Ankers, NZISS has put considerable effort into reassessing many Special 
Benefits declined prior to the Ankers decision and into issuing instructions on how to 
correctly assess entitlement to ensure compliance with the new ministerial directions. 
The total number of customers whose entitlement was reassessed amounted to 
10,303 . Of these only 593 cases resulted in a change of entitlement, that is, less than 
6%_21 
18 
19 
20 
21 
Above n L 212 . 
Above n 1, 216. 
Above n 1, 219 . 
The total amount paid out in arrears was $180,907.96 and the total administration cost was 
established at $49.300.00. Memorandum from Kathryn Byrne, Policy Advisor, NZISS to 
Lisa Tortell, Assistant Crown Counsel, Crown Law Office, Wellington, 19 July 1996. 
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Given the findings in Ankers, one might expect a greater number of reassessments to 
result in changes of entitlement. What does this suggest? There are three 
possibilities: 
(1) NZISS had been considering all individual special and exceptional 
circumstances and thus had been correctly establishing entitlement but they 
were unable to put sufficient evidence ofthis before the High Court (and the 
6% represents an ordinary error rate). 
(2) NZISS practice has not changed significantly since the Ankers decision such 
that even the reassessments were determined by and large as they had been 
before Ankers. 
(3) The reason that NZISS were unable to prove consideration of special and 
exceptional circumstances was that the large majority of their clients did not 
have special and/or exceptional circumstances - a fact that was established 
early on in the assessment process but not recorded as such. 
I submit that the correct position is that NZISS practice has not changed significantly 
since Ankers despite considerable work by senior officials which certainly gives the 
appearance of substantial change and improvement. Consequently NZISS may still be 
failing to comply with the ministerial direction in determining Special Benefits. 
A. What has NZISS Done to Change their Practice? 
22 
1. Written instructions to staff 
Several information bulletins and reminders about the correct 
assessment procedure and the need to consider all individual 
commitments and circumstances have been issued to staff 
All manual instructions have been updated and loaded on to the 
SWIFTT computer system where they are now automatically updated 
by further information bulletins or new policy statements. 22 
Interview with Iona Cameron. Customer Services Officer, NZISS, Wellington Office, 8 July 
1996. 
23 
24 
25 
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Consequently staff now have immediate and easy access to up to date 
information from essentially one source, thus overcoming a problem 
associated generally with the level of competence ofNZISS staff and 
the accuracy of their work - a problem highlighted by the Social Policy 
Agency's evaluation of the Special Benefit and the Special Needs 
Grants Programmes in 1993 . 23 
2. Discretion training 
Training seminars on the use of discretion have been conducted at 
district offices by two Head Office policy analysts . 
This training is ongoing and currently involves two policy analysts 
delivering two to three days per week, either at the request of a district 
office or on the analyst's own motion following an unusual high or low 
in the Special Benefit statistics recorded for a particular district. 24 
3. SWIFTT computer programme 
Previously SWIFTT automatically calculated entitlement to Special 
Benefit and the rate payable based on a formula assessment. SWIFTT 
has since been amended to provide "special circumstances" and 
"depart from formula" indicators which subsequently allow officers to 
waive the $10 deficit and 30% allowable fixed costs limits and 
manually enter an amount at any rate. 25 In short, SWIFTT no longer 
precludes the exercise of discretion. 
Evaluation Unit, Social Policy Agency, An Evaluation of the Special Needs Grants and 
Special Benefit Programmes, Social Policy Agency, Wellington, 1993, 23 . 
This would be picked up via a current monitoring progranune which nevertheless appears 
to be somewhat haphazard. Interview with Kathryn Byrne, Policy Analyst, Head Office, 
NZISS, 19 July 1996. 
Interview with Helen McGillvray, Compass Officer, Porirua Office NZISS, l l July 1996 
and SWIFIT Special Benefit Screen Printout, NZISS, 11 July 1996. 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
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4. Decision summary sheets 
Decision summary or disposal sheets which provide a checklist of 
factors to consider and record in arriving at a decision to grant or 
decline Special benefit, have been issued to staff 26 Decision sheets 
represent a valuable tool in ensuring accuracy and ultimately 
compliance with ministerial directions. In a busy, pressured work 
environment they are often relied upon as the sole source of 
information. 27 It is now mandatory for a decision sheet to accompany 
every Special Benefit decision. Failure to complete a decision sheet is 
recorded as an individual staff error.28 
Given that the decision sheet may be heavily relied upon by a number 
of staff, one would think it important for the sheet to specify what 
factors to consider, it does not do so, nor does it remind staff to 
inform customers of the factors that bear on their eligibility, thereby 
allowing customers the opportunity to state, for example, special or 
exceptional reasons for expenditure. This is particularly significant 
given the findings in Ankers that despite manual instructions requiring 
that customers are asked to detail their special circumstances, this was 
not observed in the majority of cases29 and the finding that failure to 
allow such opportunity to put forward information relevant to 
decision-making constitutes a breach of natural justice. 30 
NZJSS Information Bulletin 1995/078 "Special Benefit", Wellington, 2 October 1995. 
Interview with Steve Taute, Customer Services Officer, Wellington, 9 July 19%. 
Interviews with Customer Services Officers, Iona Cameron, Wellington, District Office, 
8 July 1996; Steve Taute, Wellington District Office, 9 July 1996; Helen McGillvray, 
Porirua Office. 11 July 1996; Samantha Scott-Smith, Porirua Office, 11 July 1996. The 
decision sheet is set out in the Appendix. 
Above n 1, 217. 
Above n 1, 219 . 
31 
32 
33 
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5. Application form 
The Special Benefit application form has been changed since Ankers. 
The relevant question pertaining to entitlement is question 5 which 
asks ' 'What individual circumstances do you have which mean you 
should get a special benefit?" An 11-line box is provided, presumably 
for a detailed answer. 
The amended application form can be subjected to the same criticisms 
as Thorp J made regarding the previous one. The form seeks details 
of weekly financial commitments but not of the reasons for that 
expenditure.31 In addition, the application form would also breach the 
requirements of natural justice applying Thorp J' s reasoning that: 32 
administrative fairness .. . includes an opportunity to place 
before the decision maker information relevant to the 
decision. An applicant cannot be said to have been given a 
fair opportunity to do this unless he or she is also given a fair 
opportunity to comprehend the conditions upon which such 
benefits are granted, and at least the principal criteria 
bearing on eligibility. 
The amended application form does not indicate eligibility criteria nor 
does it provide applicants with an opportunity to put relevant 
information forward . The question is relatively meaningless to most 
applicants. 33 
See above n 1, 217 and NZISS "Special Benefit Application" form. 
Above n 1, 219. 
NZISS interviews indicate that most applicants simply write "not enough money to pay 
bills" or something of a similar nature. 
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The concept of individual circumstance is even less clear than special 
circumstances and the form provides no indication of possible answers 
to this question, thereby reducing the likelihood of obtaining sufficient 
information to consider all an applicant ' s financial circumstances and 
commitments. 
B. Why NZISS Action to Date is Inadequate 
The written instructions and reminders to staff, the manual revisions, the 
training, the amended SWIFTT computer programme, the amended 
application form, and the decision summary sheets appear to constitute a 
massive effort to redress previous misapplication of the Minister' s directions 
and one would expect that such a massive effort would yield considerable 
positive change. I submit that it has not, and that NZISS is still substantially 
failing to comply with the ministerial direction regarding Special Benefit in the 
sense that discretion is not genuinely exercised in the majority of cases. 
With regard to the decision summary sheets and the amended application 
forms these are simply designed in a way that frustrates their underlying 
purposes. On a more general level I submit three reasons in support of the 
contention that NZISS practice has changed little since Ankers and NZISS is 
still substantially failing to comply with the ministerial directions regarding 
Special Benefit. 
( 1) The ministerial direction itself does not make practical sense. 
Although it appears precise, it is in fact vague and unworkable. 
(2) Even if that were not so, problems with the information disseminated 
by Head Office NZISS has resulted in a failure to communicate to 
some staff, or at the very least, some staff have failed to understand, 
how the directions can be practically applied, that is, how the formula 
can be manipulated and subsequently how an appropriate rate of 
Special Benefit can be determined. 
34 
35 
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(3) The existence of institutional barriers to the effective exercise of 
discretion and therefore compliance with the ministerial direction. 
1. Unworkable ministerial direction 
In ·effect the ministerial direction asks staff to follow a formula, which 
itself precludes consideration of some financial commitments and 
circumstances, then pay Special Benefit at an appropriate rate in light 
of the applicants' overall financial commitments and circumstances. 
I agree with the submissions made by Mr Harrison in the Ankers case 
with respect to the previous ministerial direction and argue that it 
applies to the current ministerial direction with even more force :34 
It is logically and legally impossible both to comply with the 
terms of the operative parts of the direction and to comply 
with the statutory obligation to consider the wider picture. No 
mental gymnastics on the part of the decision-maker can 
encompass the task - or at least, not honestly. 
Thus, there can be no genuine exercise of discretion. 
This argument was rejected by Thorp J on the grounds that the 
operative parts of the direction were exemplary rather than mandatory, 
and that: 35 
Above n 1, 206 
Above n I , 207 
the use of a formula to promote consistency in the exercise of 
discretion is unobjectionable, provided it is seen as a guide 
and not as a rnle ... So long as that assessment remains a 
guide, and is subject to reconsideration in the light of the 
applicant's overall situation it is unobjectionable. 
36 
37 
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I submit that while the ministerial direction does not provide that the 
formula assessment is mandatory it is, if not actually intended to be, 
interpreted by staff as a rule and not a guide. This phenomenon has 
been examined by Galligan in a number of contexts and as he notes " ... 
what may be discretionary from an external legal point of view, may be 
anything but discretionary from the internal point of view of officials 
within the system". 36 Thus I submit that NZISS is not in fact 
genuinely exercising their discretion, but rather continuing to apply a 
rule(s) . 
2. Insufficient knowledge about how to manipulate the formula 
Even if one assumes that the ministerial direction makes sense 
conceptually, without the formula, how is entitlement to Special 
Benefit determined in practice? 
In response to this question Pat Thomas, Manager Long Term 
Benefits, explained: if officers determine that Special Benefit should be 
paid at a rate different from that yielded by the formula, having 
exercised discretion and taken the listed factors into account, officers 
may vary any part of the formula to take account of an applicant ' s 
individual circumstances, that is, any cost which is not usually allowed, 
may be allowed (including those specified as non-qualifying costs and 
those supposedly covered by the standard income costs) and; the $10 
deduction may be waived along with the 30% of fixed costs limit. 37 
Galligan, DJ Discretionary Powers: A legal study of official discretion (Clarendon Press, 
Oxford, 1986) 13 . 
Interview with Pat Thomas, Manager, Long Tenn Benefits, NZISS, Wellington, 19 July 
1996. 
38 
39 
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The vital piece of information missing from the manual instructions, 
the information bulletins and the decision summary sheets, which 
appears to have been omitted in training and which is not known by at 
least some of the staff"8 is that, in assessing Special Benefit, they may 
allow costs they usually would not allow - costs precluded by the 
existing rules about Special Benefit. Without this information - this 
specific direction that the rules can be overridden - staff cannot comply 
with the ministerial direction and consider all individual circumstances 
and commitments precisely because they regard the formula as a rule 
except insofar as they are told to deviate from it. 39 
The ministerial direction requires completion of a formula assessment 
followed by reconsideration taking into account all of the applicant's 
particular financial commitments and circumstances. I submit that the 
process of completing the formula inevitably precludes consideration 
of all financial circumstances. 
The allowable costs and standard income costs parts of the formula 
weed out a number of costs as non-qualifying. Thus the costs 
remaining after completion of the formula assessment represent only 
some of the applicant's financial circumstances. 
If staff are not aware that they may allow any costs they will not 
consider adjusting entitlement in light of the overall financial 
circumstances, as required by clause 8 of the ministerial direction, 
because they will have an inadequate information base from which to 
do so. Rather they will consider allowable commitments and 
circumstances, and in some 'deserving ' cases, waive the $10 deduction 
and/or the 30% limit accordingly. 
Interviews with NZISS staff: Steve Taute, Wellington, 9 July 1996; Helen McGillvray, 
Porirua, 11 July 1996; Samantha Scott-Smith. Porirua, 11 July 1996; Jasper Williamson, 
Lower Hutt, 27 July 1996. 
See Ch 11.2910 in NZISS, Supplementary Allowances and Grants Manual, Wellington, 
October 1995. 
40 
Page 15 
The discretion conferred by the ministerial direction to pay Special 
Benefit at any rate, or not pay it at all, is meaningless in this context. 
Rectifying this omission and amending the manual and the decision 
sheets accordingly, along with changing the application form, would 
go a long way towards ensuring compliance with the ministerial 
directions and more effective exercise of discretion. 
3. Institutional ba"iers to effective exercise of discretion in NZ/SS 
NZISS faces a number of barriers to effective exercise of its discretion 
generally, and in particular to exercising a greater degree of discretion 
in Special Benefit assessment, thereby maintaining compliance with the 
ministerial directions. These barriers explain why there may have been 
little significant change since Ankers in the way NZIS S staff assess 
Special Benefits. 
(a) Organisational 
(i) Authority leakage. 
NZISS is an extremely large organisation with a great 
number of levels through which general and specific 
directives are transmitted downwards to front-line staff. 
The greater the number of levels, the greater the 
number of"discretionary decisions which may not 
altogether conform with the wishes and intentions of 
senior administrators". 40 
Gregory, Rand Hutchesson, P The Parliamentary Ombudsman (George Allen & Unwin, 
London. 1975) 23. 
41 
42 
Above n 40. 24. 
Above n 40, 22 . 
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Anthony Downs calls this phenomenon "authority 
leakage".41 Where directives, involving an assessment 
as complex as Special Benefit, with so many factors to 
consider, are being filtered through a number oflevels 
it is almost inevitable that the knowledge and practice 
of front-line staff will not accord with senior 
administrators' beliefs about it. The ability to include 
or disregard any cost as an allowable cost if the 
individual circumstances so warrant is a salient example 
of the kind of knowledge believed by senior 
administrators to be practised; and yet it is precisely the 
kind of knowledge which some staff lack and others fail 
to practice. 
(ii) Institutional culture. 
Another organisational feature which acts as a barrier 
to the effective exercise of discretion is the culture of 
the organisation. 
I submit that NZISS is subject to "over-organisation". 
This means that conduct is generally dictated ''by 
elaborate codes of rules and regulations prescribing in 
great detail how the official must behave ... ". In such 
an environment, "strict adherence to the rules becomes 
the cardinal virtue" and a preoccupation with ritual and 
procedure for their own sake results. 42 
43 
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The conduct ofNZISS officials is subject to countless 
rules and regulations contained in countless statutes, 
manuals, circulars, information bulletins, posters, and 
so on. There are rules about virtually everything and 
discretion is predominantly, if not almost exclusively, 
confined to rule and fact interpretation. 
Introducing a highly discretionary assessment 
procedure into such an environment is almost inevitably 
bound to fail. Requiring a high degree of discretion 
from staff may be asking something of staff that they 
are incapable of delivering. Thus discretion may be 
rarely exercised, if not predominantly ignored. 
Alternatively discretion may be confined by locally-
developed rules thereby putting into operation "a 
system of rules promulgated by those not in authority 
to make rules" .43 
The new ministerial direction regarding Special Benefit 
asks staff to follow a formula then consider all 
individual circumstances. If they warrant payment at a 
different rate, the formula can be disregarded - what 
then forms the basis from which an assessment and 
decision can be made? 
Goodin, R "Welfare, Rights and Discretion" Oxford Jn/ leg Stud 6 ( 1988) 232, 260. 
44 
45 
46 
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Interviews with NZISS staff suggest that:
44 
( 1) new rules or modified old rules are developed; 
or 
(2) the formula is applied and the specified 
discretionary elements, the $10 deduction and 
30% of fixed costs limit are varied; or 
(3) the formula is applied as is; or 
(4) it goes in the "too hard basket". 
In short, NZISS staff will find rules on which to base 
their assessments even where that rule is subject to a 
wider discretion. Developing new rules (and this 
includes doing so by modifying old rules) at the district 
level raises issues oflegitimacy in rule-making, and 
potentially issues of ongoing failure to comply with 
ministerial directions. It also raises issues of potential 
arbitrariness resulting from "the impartial application of 
abstract rules which limits the factors taken into 
account thereby reducing the congruence between 
particular decisions and underlying purposes".
45 
(b) Staff training 
The department's own Evaluation Unit has highlighted the 
variation in competence and exposure to training among 
NZISS staff.46 The work pressures faced by staff often 
preclude the 'luxury' ohime away from the front line for 
Interviews with Customer Services Officers Steve Taute and Iona Cameron, Wellington, 
9 July 1996 and Samantha Scott-Smith and Helen McGillvray, Porirua. 11 July 1996. 
Above n 36, 18. 
Above n 23 , 19. 
47 
48 
49 
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training. 47 Training is predominantly SWIFTT-based with the 
objective of acquiring sufficient technical skills to move 
through the required computer screens and activate some sort 
of payment or decline decision 48. 
Very little detailed policy is covered in training and training in 
the exercise of discretion has not been carried out until the 
recent post-Ankers Head Office training on discretion.49 Thus 
it is fairly clear that the training environment is not one which 
promotes and facilitates the exercise of discretion but rather 
lends itself to the promulgation of rules. Rules can be taught 
more quickly and easily than discretionary policy and the 
SWIFTT framework, including training modules, is based on 
rules. 
IfNZISS is to achieve substantive change in its practice and 
genuinely exercise the discretion conferred by the current 
ministerial direction, NZISS training programmes will be 
required to undergo major reconstruction. 
(c) Work pressures and performance standards 
For the majority of staff there are a number of disincentives to 
the proper exercise of discretion. The most significant of these 
disincentives are work pressure and performance standards. 
I submit that given the increasing workload pressure facing 
NZISS staff and the standards by which their performance is 
monitored, and ultimately their remuneration determined, the 
majority of staff disregard their discretionary powers in favour 
Training is coordinated at a regional level. NZISS training in the greater Wellington area 
is carried out by one exi,erienced NZ1SS officer with responsibility for training in the 
Wellington, Porirua and Lower Hutt district offices. 
NZISS interview with Debbie Kaye, Training Officer, Greater Wellington, 9 July 1996. 
Above n 48 . 
50 
51 
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of a quick and easy application of rules. Moreover I suggest 
that from the standpoint of an NZISS officer, this represents a 
rational action. 
(i) Work pressure. 
NZISS has survived several restructurings, losing many 
experienced staff in the process. Middle management 
and supervisory levels have been eliminated leaving 
more work to be done by fewer staff for an increasingly 
poor and desperate client population. 50 
As NZISS staff see increasing numbers of people in 
need, it is inevitable that they become somewhat 
desensitised to that need. As a result, they may feel 
disinclined to "take up the fight" on behalf of customers 
by pursuing the full extent of their discretionary 
powers. 
In addition the pressures of this high workload often 
result in failure to fully explore applicants ' 
circumstances and inform applicants of their 
entitlements. 51 
(ii) Performance standards 
Individual staff performance standards focus primarily 
on output, the number of people and actions processed. 
Barwick, Helena. Passing the Buck : NZ/SS procedures for assessing applications for 
emerging assistance : the problem of DSW referrals to foodbanks , Downtown Ministry, 
Wellington, December 1994, 31. 
Above n 28 and interviews with Customer Services Officers Jasper Williamson and Mike 
Braniff, Lower Hutt, 27 July 1996. 
52 Above n 28. 
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Staff will be praised for processing a great number of 
actions. They will be admonished for exceeding 
"disposal times", spending too much time with one 
customer, or failing to process the required number of 
actions per day. Disposal times for each district and 
region are subject to intense competition. There is high 
praise for managers who undercut the disposal 
standards, not to mention high bonuses, and criticism 
for managers who exceed the standards. There is only 
one quality standard for individual staff - an accuracy 
rate percentage which is calculated pursuant to a full 
check of one day' s work randomly carried out every 
two weeks. 52 
Clearly there is a massive emphasis on quantity over 
quality. It is hardly surprising then that the majority of 
staff choose the quickest route to a decision. That 
route may well be not to ask too many questions, to 
follow whatever rules have been laid down and to 
disregard any discretion to do otherwise. 
In conclusion, it would appear that the current NZISS 
environment is not one which fosters the exercise of 
discretion, much less the proper exercise of discretion 
according to ministerial directions and the law. In 
recognition of the current NZISS environment, the 
better solution for NZISS customers may well lie in a 
greater reliance on rules. 
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V. THE MOVE TO GREATER DISCRETION 
The post-Ankers ministerial direction regarding Special Benefit confers much wider 
discretionary powers upon individual front-line staff There is a formula to follow but 
that formula may be disregarded if, in the opinion of individual staff, the particular 
circumstances and commitments of an applicant warrant payment of Special Benefit 
at a rate that is higher or lower than the rate yielded by the formula assessment. 
It would appear that NZISS has gone from one extreme to the other. Prior to Ankers 
there was a specific ministerial direction and NZISS practice consisted largely of the 
mechanical application of a formula which was widely regarded and promulgated as a 
rule rather than a guideline and as such effectively precluded the exercise of 
discretion. In the post-Ankers era the ministerial direction is much more general and 
NZISS practice consists of a mechanical application of a formula which can then be 
thrown out to be replaced by a modified version of the formula or, potentially, any 
other method of assessment that takes into account the required factors - general 
principles and those listed in clauses 8 and 9. In short, Special Benefit has moved 
from a system of very limited discretion to one that is highly discretionary. Or has it? 
Certainly the direction appears to confer a much greater degree of discretion however 
I maintain that NZISS practice has not greatly changed. The formula is still applied 
as a rule in the majority of cases although there is some evidence that in a minority of 
cases the discretion is exercised to the fullest extent possible - and done so by 
different officers in different ways. 53 
A. Reasons for the Move to Greater Discretion 
53 
I submit that first and foremost the move to confer wider discretionary powers 
on NZISS front-line officials is a direct consequence of the Ankers case, a 
reactive response to prevent future challenges of a similar nature. 
Interviews with NZISS Customer Services Officers: Iona Cameron, Wellington, 8 July 1996 
and Mike Braniff, Lower Hutt. 27 July 1996. 
54 
55 
56 
57 
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The new ministerial direction conferring such wide discretion and couched in 
what appears to be a deliberately vague manner was issued immediately 
following the Ankers judgement. NZISS solicitor, Rod Robson, concedes that 
"the writing was on the wall" long before the judgment was delivered54 and 
work on a new ministerial direction may well have been underway before the 
judgement was handed down. 
I submit that this reactive response may have been a reasonably superficial 
action done in the interests of being seen to be making a change where change 
was needed without ever intending real and substantive change. 
I suggest that the motivation was fiscal as well as political. The Ankers case 
publicised the Special Benefit criteria as harsh and unreasonable even though 
the court found the ministerial direction valid. The limits placed on Special 
Benefit assessment to avoid fiscal blowout55 had been widely criticised by 
community groups, local Citizens Advice Bureaus and by the department's 
own Evaluation Unit. 56 
Galligan suggests that: 57 
" ... within the welfare system efforts are made .. . to retain powers in a 
highly discretionary form in order to avoid or conceal the necessity for 
difficult policy choices about the distribution of resources. For example. a 
discretionary format may allow reduction in expenditure without appearing 
to make changes to the system." 
Conversely a discretionary format may allow continued reduced expenditure 
while appearing to remove expenditure limits. This possibility was raised by 
the department's own Evaluation Unit in 1993 when the Social Policy Agency 
evaluation team observed that "[a] latent function of a discretionary system is 
Interview, Rod Robson, NZISS solicitor, Wellington, 16 July 1996. 
Above n l , 199. 
Above n 23, 20. 
Above n 36, 133. 
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that it can be used to encourage staff to operate within a defined budget".58 
Thus the status of a district budget could limit the amount of Special Benefit 
assistance available in a given district. 59 
If one assumes that this is true, the failure of the massive NZISS effort to 
bring about substantial change becomes totally plausible. NZISS, as with any 
public agency, is fully aware of the importance of "being seen to be doing the 
right thing", sometimes to the detriment of substantively doing the right thing. 
Procedural fairness is the cardinal virtue. Thus NZISS can be seen to have 
exerted themselves in ensuring compliance with the ministerial directions. 
They can even be seen to be more generous with Special Benefit but I submit 
that substantial change cannot be seen quite so readily. And that may just 
represent the ideal solution for a resource-constrained NZISS . 
B. Is a Move to Greater Discretion a Good Thing? : The Discretion Versus 
Rules Debate 
58 
59 
60 
Would the assessment of Special benefit, and indeed, NZISS practice in 
general, be better served by wide discretionary powers or by rules? Clearly 
there is no simple answer. 
Schwartz and Wade describe discretion as "a tool, indispensable for 
individualisation of justice". They argue that "[r]ules alone, untempered by 
discretion, cannot cope with the complexities of modern government" but 
they also warn that: 60 
[d}iscretion is a tool only when properly used; like an axe. if can be a 
weapon for mayhem or murder. In a government of men and of laws. the 
Above n 23 , 22. 
Above n 23 , 22 . 
Schwartz.Band Wade, HWR Legal Control of Government (Oxford University Press. 
London. 1972) 25. 
61 
63 
64 
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portion that is a government of men, like a malignant cancer, often tends to 
stifle the portion that is a government of laws. Perhaps nine-tenths of 
injustice in our legal system flows from discretion and perhaps only one-
tenth from rules. 
This accords with the views of Davis who asserts that on a rule-discretion 
continuum, the most frequent and serious injustice occurs at that end of the 
scale where the greatest degree of discretion lies.61 These views suggest that 
a move to greater discretion in the assessment of Special Benefit may 
potentially pose a greater threat to NZISS clients than the previous rigid 
application of a formula - or rules. 
The problems with a discretionary system are that it can lead to arbitrariness, 
uncertainty and inconsistencies and inequities within and between different 
authorities. These are the classic objections to discretion which Goodin 
discusses in ''Welfare, Rights and Discretion" where he argues that the 
problems with discretion are inherent in the practice of discretion itself and 
can only be surmounted, if at all, by removing discretion from officials. 62 
The problems with discretion commonly prompt the cry that rule-making is 
the solution. Rule-making, it is claimed, will bring certainty and predictability; 
it will eliminate arbitrariness and it will enable people to stake a claim based 
on rights. 63 
However Goodin asserts that rules are not the answer, for as he observes: 64 
[t}he problems ... may be inherent. not merely in discretion but also in the 
purposes which those discretions were supposed to serve. If so, then any 
system (rules or anything else) that also serves those purposes will also 
necessarily display those same faults . 
Above n 2. 14. 
Above n 43 , 243 . 
See generally above n 43 and above n 36, 13 and Jowell, J "The Legal Control of 
Administrative Discretion" Public Law (1973) 178. 
Above n 43. 250. 
65 
66 
67 
68 
69 
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On that basis, the application of rules may be as arbitrary as the exercise of 
discretion in the sense that it limits the factors taken into account, thereby 
reducing congruence between particular decisions and their underlying 
purposes.65 
Or as Jowell explains it: "rules typically act as shields, permitting legalistic 
official behaviour with no apparent rational relation between fidelity to the 
rule and [the] original ends for which the rule was promulgated.',66 
The practice ofNZISS in strictly applying a formula which purports to 
consider all an individual's financial circumstances is an example of such a 
rule. Rigid application of the formula has denied entitlement to applicants 
experiencing considerable need due to special circumstances. 67 
Applying Goodin' s theory to the uncertainty objection to discretion, 
discretionary Special Benefit decisions may be unpredictable partly because of 
the great variety of considerations that must be taken into account in their 
assessment: "Insofar as the rules that replace discretion attempt to capture the same 
range of considerations, their operation may (at least from the client's point of view) 
be as unpredictable as the discretionary case worker's.',68 
Clearly rules do not solve the problems associated with the exercise of 
discretion and in the welfare context particularly, expecting rules to be more 
effective than discretion in determining concepts like 'need' appears to be, as 
Jowell suggests, expecting something of rules that they are incapable of 
achieving. 69 
Above n 36, 250. 
Jowell, J "The Legal Control of Administrative Discretion" Public law (1973) 178, 193. 
See above n 1. 
Above n 43, 251. 
Above n 66. 211. 
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Yet Special Benefit programme clients and community agencies have 
expressed a preference for rules over discretion in relation to benefit 
entitlement generally and Special Benefit in particular, "so that you can come 
and say ... this person fits the criteria, therefore she should get it; not can she 
have it?"70 and so that decisions are not made on the basis of value 
judgements. 71 
Staff views also accord with those of clients and community agencies. Staff 
prefer clear policy rules with little or no discretion because they promote 
consistency and efficiency as entitlements can be determined with much 
greater speed.72 Perhaps a high degree of discretion is unsuited to the NZISS 
environment. 
I submit that the approach of KC Davis offers a more viable solution to the 
problems NZISS face in assessing benefits generally, and Special Benefits in 
particular, than an endless debate about whether discretion or rules will best 
attain the desired ends. To use Davis' words it seems clear that the solution 
lies in finding "the optimum point on the rule to discretion scale". 73 
C. Finding the Optimum Point on the Rule to Discretion Scale 
70 
71 
73 
I submit that the current ministerial direction and rules regarding Special 
Benefit do not represent the optimum point on the rule to discretion scale. 
But rather they allow for the dangers inherent in both discretion and in rules 
to be played out. 
Above n 23 , 19. 
Above n 23, 20. 
Above n 23 and above n 51. 
Above n 2, 15. 
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Interviews with NZISS staff support this contention. Descriptions of the 
approaches individual staff take to assessing Special Benefits suggest that the 
majority of staff apply the formula somewhat rigidly74 and rarely genuinely 
exercise their discretion, 75 thus negating individualised justice and 
subsequently failing to achieve the underlying purposes of the rules. 
On the other hand, a minority of staff choose a variety of methods to calculate 
an appropriate Special Benefit rate,76 that is, they exercise their discretion to 
the fullest extent possible under the ministerial direction. 
This results in uncertainty, unpredictability and inconsistency and inequities 
within and between offices. In addition, selecting their own methods 
introduces an element of arbitrariness into Special Benefit assessment; 
arbitrariness that would not exist to the same extent if the assessment 
procedure was confined by rules. 
D. A Suggestion 
74 
75 
76 
NZISS face two problems in the assessment of Special Benefit. First, the 
expected discretion is not exercised in the majority of cases. The cause? The 
nature ofNZISS culture - a rule-bound culture subject to high workload and 
ever-increasing efficiency demands. 
The solution? Rules which not only demand that discretion is exercised at 
every required step, but explain how to exercise that discretion. These rules 
would need to be readily accessible, easy to use and reflected in performance 
standards. 
Although not as rigidly as before Ankers. 
Above n 51. 
These methods include: Disregarding the formula and paying an increased cost resulting 
from special circumstances as the Special Benefit rate; varying parts of the formula; 
completing an income versus outgoings budget and paying any deficit as Special Benefit: 
Above n 28 . 
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Secondly, in a minority of cases too much discretion is exercised. The cause? 
The latitude afforded staff by the ministerial direction and inadequately 
specified rules. The solution? Confine the discretion by rules requiring that a 
specified assessment procedure is followed in all cases. However, that 
specified assessment procedure must contain discretionary elements at every 
stage. 
How would these solutions work in practice and what would they look like? 
Both solutions can be relatively easily implemented, using the current 
ministerial direction and most of the current rules, by formulating the 
discretionary elements as positive rules and by confining assessment to the 
existing formula which nevertheless incorporates discretion at every step. 
Some suggested rules: 
(I) In assessing allowable costs every cost put forward by the applicant 
must be considered and allowed if there is a good reason for that cost 
or it is justified given all the applicants ' financial commitments and 
circumstances. 
For example: Applicant has large Visa bill due to husband running up 
costs after he beat her up and left town. 
(2) Standard living costs in excess of those covered by the standard 
income costs figure must be considered and allowed if they are 
reasonable given the applicant's particular financial commitments and 
circumstances. 
For example: high electricity costs for an applicant with a young baby 
in the middle of winter or an asthmatic child. 
(3) The $10 deduction and 30% fixed costs limit must be waived if the 
applicant's particular financial commitments and circumstances so 
warrant . 
(4) The formula assessment procedure must be followed in all cases. 
Application of the formula with its integral discretionary 
considerations yields the appropriate rate of Special Benefit. 
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Rules alone are inadequate. In order to ensure genuine exercise of discretion 
within its proper confines, each of these rules would need to: be widely 
promulgated; feature prominently in ongoing training; be written into manual 
instructions; be shown to have been applied on decision summary sheets; be 
incorporated into SWIFTT and; perhaps most importantly, be reflected in 
performance standards and measurements. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
I have argued that since Ankers and the new ministerial direction NZISS practice in 
relation to the assessment of Special Benefit has not changed as significantly as one 
would expect. In the majority of cases a formula assessment, which precludes the 
genuine exercise of discretion, is still somewhat rigidly applied. The reasons 
submitted to explain this include the unworkability of the ministerial direction itself, 
the inadequacy ofNZISS actions and the existence of institutional barriers to the 
effective exercise of discretion in organisations such as NZISS . 
I have concluded that a move to greater discretion is not a 'good thing' for NZISS 
and that a greater reliance on rules, albeit 'discretionary rules', offers better prospects 
for NZISS . I have suggested that the problems NZISS face in exercising discretion in 
relation to Special Benefit can be addressed by the formulation of positive rules which 
require that discretion be exercised at every stage of the assessment procedure; and 
by confining assessment to the one specified procedure. 
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APPENDIX 
Relevant Sections of the Social Security Act 1964 
5. Exercise of powers by Director-General - ( 1) The powers, functions and 
discretions conferred on the Director-General by this Act ([or the Social Welfare 
(Transitional Provisions) Act 1990]] shall be exercised under the general direction 
and control of the Minister of Social Welfare. 
(2) In the exercise of such powers, functions, and discretions the Director-
General shall comply with any general or special directions given to the Director-
General in writing by the Minister. As soon as practicable after giving any such 
direction, the Minister shall publish in the Gazette and lay before the House of 
Representatives a copy of the direction. 
"Special Benefit 
61 G. Special Benefit - Subject to section 68A of this Act, the Director-General 
may, in the Director-General's discretion, fix a special entitlement to a special benefit 
in respect of any person whether or not that person is receiving any other benefit 
under this Part of this Act or the Social Welfare (Transitional Provisions) Act 1990 or 
any pension or allowance under the War Pensions Act 1954, if the Director-General is 
satisfied that, after taking into account all of that person's financial circumstances and 
commitments, including any benefit payable under this Part of this Act or the Social 
Welfare (Transitional Provisions) Act 1990 and any pension or allowance payable 
under the War Pensions Act 1954, such a special entitlement is justified." 
Section 61: Special benefit (3008] 
[3008) Direction dated 28 March 1995: Section 61: Special 
benefit 
DIRECTION BY MINISTER OF SOCIAL WELFARE 
IN THE MATTER of section 5 
of the Social Security Act 1964 
To: The Director-General of Social Welfare 
Pursuant to section 5(2) of the Social Security Act 1964 (the Act) , I, 
PETER JOHN GRESHAM, Minister of Social Welfare, HEREBY give 
you the following direction. 
PART! 
GRANTS OF SPECIAL BENEFIT 
In the exercise of your discretion to grant a special benefit under 
section 61 G of the Act, and without derogating from your duty to have 
regard to the particular financial circumstances and commitments of 
the applicant, you shall have regard to the following matters. 
General principles 
1. THAT the intention of a special benefit under the Act is to alleviate 
financial hardship and that a special benefit should not to be 
granted unless without the grant, the applicant or a person 
dependent upon the applicant would suffer financial hardship. 
2. THAT a special benefit should not normally be granted unless the 
applicant's deficiency of income over his or her expenditure and 
commitments is reasonably substantial, and that deficiency is 
likely to continue for a period that justifies special benefit being 
granted. 
3. THAT a special benefit should be considered only in respect of 
costs of the applicant that are essential and not reasonably 
avoidable. 
4. THAT in considering any application for special benefit, 
consideration should be given to -
(a) The applicant's ability to meet the deficiency from the 
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applicant's own resources; and 
(b) The assistance that is or might be available to the 
applicant from other sources to meet the applicant's 
deficiency. 
In particular, when considering -
(c) An application for a special benefit by a full-time student 
or the student's dependent spouse, you should take into 
account the availability of financial support during the 
academic year under the student allowance or student 
loan schemes; or 
(d) An application for special benefit for the costs of any 
essential health services or disability services (as those 
terms are defined in the Health and Disability Services Act 
1993), you should take into account the assistance 
available under that Act, -
and special benefit should not normally be considered for expenses 
normally covered by the assistance available under those schemes or 
that Act unless the applicant has extraordinary expenses and has 
exhausted his or her entitlements under those schemes or that Act. 
Assessment procedure 
5. THAT subject to paragraphs 8 and 9, where-
(a) An applicant for special benefit has cash assets -
(i) In the case of a single person, of a value of not 
more than the equivalent of four times the 
maximum weekly invalid's benefit rate payable to a 
single person; or 
(ii) In the case of a married person or a sole parent, of 
a value of not more than the equivalent of four 
times the maximum weekly invalid 's benefit rate 
payable to a married couple; and 
(b) The applicant's disposable income is less than the 
appropriate standard costs -
you should regard as justified the fixing of a special benefit at a rate 
which is the lesser of a and b where a is an amount equal to the 
difference between -
(c) The applicant's disposable income; and 
(d) The appropriate standard costs less $10 a week, -
and b is an amount equal to 30 percent of the applicant's allowable 
costs. 
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Example 
A single unemployment beneficiary with 2 dependent children, whose 
weekly chargeable income is $210.45 and whose weekly allowable 
costs are $94.30. 
Paragraph 5(b) calculation 
Chargeable income 
less allowable costs 
Disposable income 
less standard costs 
Deficiency 
210.45 
94.30 
116.15 
136.15 
(20.00) 
Calculation of the benefit: 
Paragraph 5(c) is the disposable income = $116.15 
Paragraph 5(d) is $136.15 - $1 O = $126.15 
The difference a = $1 O 
b is 30% of allowable costs = $28.29 
A special benefit of S10 a week is justified, subject to paragraphs 8 
and 9. 
6. THAT until the transfer to Regional Health Authorities of the 
responsibility for purchasing care for people with disabilities who 
are in residential care (intended to take place on 1 July 1995) and 
subject to paragraphs 8 and 9, a special benefit should be 
considered justified in respect of a person with psychiatric or 
physical disabilities who is in residential care and whose 
chargeable income is less than the specified amount. The rate of 
special benefit considered justified should be the difference 
between a and b where a is the specified amount and b is the 
person's chargeable income less the appropriate personal 
allowance. 
7. THAT subject to paragraphs 8 and 9, a special benefit should be 
considered justified in respect of a person receiving training 
benefit under the Act who incurs additional accommodation costs 
because he or she is undergoing training away from his or her 
usual home. The rate of the special benefit considered justified 
should be the lesser of -
(a) The additional weekly accommodation costs incurred; and 
(b) S100perweek. 
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8. THAT upon completion of the appropriate calculation set out in 
paragraph 5, 6, or 7, you shall consider whether there is 
justification for increasing or decreasing the rate of special benefit 
paid to the applicant, or to fix or decline to fix an entitlement to 
special benefit , having regard to the principles set out in 
paragraphs 1 to 4 and to the following matters: 
(a) Whether the applicant has any special or unusual 
financ ial expenditure compared to others in a similar 
general position to the applicant and the extent of any 
such expenditure; 
(b) Whether the applicant has any special or unusual reasons 
for any expenditure item that has caused or contributed to 
his or her deficiency; 
(c) The nature of the financial difficulty, and the likely duration 
of the deficiency; 
(d) The age and health of the applicant and his or her 
dependents and any special needs arising from that age 
or health ; 
(e) The ability of the applicant to improve his or her financial 
situation : 
(f) The causes of the applicant's financial difficulty; 
(g) The extent to which the basic necessities of life for the 
applicant or his or her dependents would be at risk if a 
grant of special benefit at the rate calculated , or another 
rate , was not made; 
(h) Any other matters that in the circumstances of the 
particular case, you consider to be relevant. 
9. THAT nothing in this Part of this direction requires you to grant a 
special benefit , or a special benefit at any particu lar rate , if, in your 
discretion, you determine that in the circumstances of the 
particular case, such grant ought not to be made. 
Application of Direction 
10. THAT this Direction should be applied to applications for special 
benefit made on or after the 1 st day of April 1995, and in respect 
of any rev iews of that benefit on or after that day. 
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PART II 
ADMINISTRATION OF THE SPECIAL BENEFIT PROGRAMME 
1. In administering the programme of special benefits, you are to 
ensure that where practicable, persons receiving special benefit 
under the Act receive appropriate advice with the objective that 
wherever possible, their need for a special benefit is eliminated or 
reduced within 6 months after the later of -
(a) The date of any grant of a special benefit after the date of 
this direction; or 
(b) Any review of a special benefit after the date of this 
direction. 
2. Cases where special benefit is being paid at a rate of more than 
$50 a week should receive priority under paragraph 1. 
PART Ill 
DEFINITIONS 
In this direction, the following definitions are used: 
Accommodation costs has the meaning in section 61 E of the Act; 
Allowable costs, in relation to an applicant and subject to section 68A 
of the Act, means any regular essential expenses reckoned on a 
weekly basis arising out of the special circumstances of the applicant 
and his or her spouse (if any) which cannot readily be avoided or 
varied, and include -
[(a) The applicant's actual accommodation costs including 
arrears, provided that any arrears incurred while the 
person was in receipt of accommodation benefit, 
accommodation supplement, rent rebate allowance, or 
tenure protection allowance under the Act are not to be 
included; and] 
(b) Hire purchase and other types of regular payments for a 
washing machine or a refrigerator or a television set or for 
household furniture where the acquisition of that item was 
essential; and 
[(c) Disability related expenses, being expenses of a kind for 
which a disability allowance would be payable under 
section 69C of the Act (but not including any counselling 
costs in excess of the amount made available by way of 
disability allowance under the Act); and 
(d) Motor vehicle repayments and reasonable running costs 
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where-
(i) The vehicle is required for the transport of the 
applicant or his or her spouse to and from paid 
employment; or 
(ii) The applicant or a member of his or her family 
suffers chronic illness or has a disability and the 
vehicle is required for that person's transport, -
and no suitable public transport is available; 
(e) Motor vehicle repayments for an applicant who is a 
beneficiary where -
(i) There is no public transport available; and 
(ii) The agreement to acquire the vehicle on terms was 
entered into prior to the applicant applying for the 
benefit; 
(f) The costs of public transport to and from paid 
employment; 
(g) The costs of essential child care (after deducting any child 
care subsidy payable under the Child Care Subsidy 
Welfare Programme)-
(i) To enable the applicant or his or her spouse to take 
part in paid employment; or 
(ii) Because the applicant or his or her spouse is 
seriously disabled or seriously ill; 
(h) For a person for whom a telephone is a necessity by 
reason of his or her -
(i) Health or disability or family circumstances; or 
(ii) Personal safety or security (for example, an elderly 
person living on his or her own, or a separated 
person with a non-molestation order against the 
spouse) ; or 
(iii) Employment (for example, an electrical worker on 
call 24 hours per day), -
the basic cost of a telephone (excluding toll charges), -
but do not include 
(i) Any fixed charges made in respect of a line or pipe used 
in the domestic supply to that person of telephone 
services, electricity, gas, or water; 
U) The costs of any tuition the applicant or his or her spouse 
or any of the applicant's dependent children is 
undertaking (including stationery, books, fees, or other 
course related costs); 
(k) Any payments required to be made by the applicant or his 
or her spouse in respect of any debt, fine, or other liability, 
other than the payments or repayments referred to in 
paragraphs (a) to (h) of this definition; 
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(I) Any fees charged by Post Office Bank Limited, a private 
savings bank, a trustee savings bank, the Public Service 
Investment Society Limited, a registered bank or a 
building society or a credit union for an account held by 
the applicant or the applicant's spouse with that bank, 
society, building society, or credit union; 
Cash assets , in relation to any person, mean assets of that person 
and his or her spouse (if any) that can be readily converted into cash 
and include: 
(a) Shares, stocks, debentures, bonus bonds, and other 
bonds; 
(b) Bank accounts, including fixed and term deposits with any 
bank, friendly society, credit union, or building society; 
(c) Money invested with or lent to any bank or other financial 
institution; 
(d) The net equity held in any property or land not used as the 
person's home; 
(e) Building society shares; 
(f) Mortgage investments and other long term loans; 
(g) Bills of exchange or promissory notes; 
(h) The applicant's share in any partnership; 
but do not include -
(i) The motor vehicle principally used by the applicant for his 
or her personal use; 
(j) A caravan, boat, or other vehicle -
(i) The net equity in which is less than $2,000; or 
(ii) Which is used by the person or a member of his or 
her family for day to day accommodation; 
(k) The personal effects of the person and his or her spocse 
(if any); 
Chargeable income, in relation to an applicant , includes: 
(a) The amount of any benefit granted under Part I of the Act; 
and 
(b) Where the applicant is receiving unsupported child's 
benefit or orphan's benefit in respect of any child, the 
difference between -
(i) The amount of that benefit; and 
(ii) The maximum amount of family support that would 
be payable under the Income Tax Act 1976 in 
respect of a child of that age as if that child was the 
applicant's dependent child; and 
(c) Any war pension received under the War Pensions Act 
1954;and 
(d) New Zealand Superannuation, Veteran's Pension, or 
transitional retirement benefit received under the Social 
Welfare (Transitional Provisions) Act 1990; and 
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(e) Income, as defined in section 3 of the Act ; and 
(f) The amount of any regular payments received under any 
welfare programme approved under section 124(1 )(d) of 
the Act (other than regular payments intended to pay or 
reimburse specified costs of the applicant); and 
(g) The amount of any child support payments -
(i) In the case of a non-beneficiary, received by the 
person under the Child Support Act 1991; or 
(ii) In the case of a beneficiary, paid to the person by 
the Child Support Agency pursuant to section 142 
of that Act ; and 
(h) The living costs component of the amount of any student 
allowance or student loan received by the applicant , -
and includes the chargeable income, as so defined, of his or her 
spouse (if any) ; 
Deficiency has the meaning in paragraph 2 of Part I of th is Direction; 
Disposable income, in relation to an applicant , means the applicant's 
weekly chargeable income after the deduction of the applicant's 
allowable costs ; 
Income, in paragraph 5(c) of Part I of this Direction, means income as 
defined in section 3 of the Act; 
Non-beneficiary means a person who is not a beneficiary; 
Personal allowance means -
(a) In the case of a person with physical disabilities, $65.96; 
(b) In the case of a person with psychiatric disabilities, 
$25.35; 
(c) In the case of a person with both physical and psychiatric 
disabilities -
(i) $65.96 if that person's disabilities are 
predominantly physical ; or 
(ii) $25.35 if that person's disabilit ies are 
predominantly psychiatric; 
Residential care, in respect of any person , means care received as a 
resident in a home either registered under section 18 of the Disabled 
Persons Community Welfare Act 1975 or approved by the Director-
General as meeting the standards required for registration under that 
Act ; 
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Specified amount means -
(a) $326.98 in the case of a person who requires daily 
supervision but not the constant supervision of a 
caregiver; 
(b) $411.45 in the case of a person who requires 24 hour per 
day supervision and care; 
(c) $479.04 in the case of a person who requires 24 hour per 
day supervision and care plus active support and therapy 
such as day programmes and rehabilitation programmes; 
Standard costs, in relation to an applicant, means the appropriate 
amount set out in the Schedule to this direction, being the proportion of 
the living costs of the applicant and his or her dependents that he or 
she may be expected to meet -
(a) From his or her benefit ; or 
(b) In the case of a non-beneficiary, from the appropriate rate 
of an unemployment benefit that would be payable to the 
applicant if he or she was entitled to that benefit, -
but do not include any of the applicant's allowable costs; 
and expressions otherwise defined in the Act shall have the meanings 
so defined unless the context otherwise requires. 
PART IV 
REVOCATION AND SAVINGS 
1. This Direction supersedes the Direction concerning special 
benefit dated 31 March 1994, which is hereby revoked with effect 
from midnight on 31 March 1995. 
2. The revocation of that Direction does not affect the validity of, or 
the continuation of, any special benefit granted pursuant to it 
before that benefit is reviewed under the provisions of section 81 
of the Act. 
Dated this 28th day of March 1995 
Peter J Gresham 
Minister of Social Welfare 
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SCHEDULE 
STANDARD COSTS 
Qualification of Applicant 
1. For a person who is not a beneficiary, or who is 
in receipt of an unemployment benefit. job search 
allowance, or training benefit, and who is : 
(a) Single aged 16 or 17 years without dependent 
children 
(b) Single aged 18 to 24 years without dependent 
children 
(c) Single aged 25 years or more without 
dependent children 
(d) Single with 1 dependent child 
(e) Single with 2 or more dependent children 
(f) Married without dependent children 
(g) Married with 1 or more dependent children 
2. For a person in receipt of an independent youth 
benefit 
3. For a person in receipt of a sickness benefit and 
who is: 
(a) Single aged 16 or 17 years without dependent 
children 
(b) Single aged 18 to 24 years without dependent 
children 
(c) Single aged 25 years or more without 
dependent children 
(d) Single with 1 dependent child 
(e) Single with 2 or more dependent children 
(f) Married without dependent children 
(g) Married with 1 or more dependent children 
4. For a person in receipt of a widow's benefit, or a 
domestic purposes benefit under section 276 of the 
Act (sole parent) or section 27C of the Act (woman 
alone), and who has: 
(a) No dependent children 
(b) 1 dependent child 
(c) 2 or more dependent children 
5. For a person in receipt of a domestic purposes 
benefit under section 27G of the Act (care of sick or 
infirm) and who is: 
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$59.17 
$59.17 
$82.47 
$120.20 
$136.15 
$154.71 
$159.78 
$59.17 
$58.34 
$81.43 
$87.18 
$120.20 
$136.15 
$181 .00 
$174.75 
$87.18 
$120.20 
($136.15] 
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(a) Single aged 16 or 17 years without dependent 
children 
(b) Single aged 18 years or more without 
dependent children 
(c) A sole parent with 1 dependent child 
(d) A sole parent with 2 or more dependent 
children 
6. For a person in receipt of invalid's benefit or 
transitional retirement benefit and who is: 
(a) Single aged 16 or 17 years without dependent 
children 
(b) Single aged 18 years or more without 
dependent children 
(c) Single with 1 dependent child 
(d) Single with 2 or more dependent children 
(e) Married without dependent children 
(f) Married with 1 or more dependent children 
7. For a person in receipt of New Zealand 
Superannuation or veteran's pension and who is : 
(a) Single without dependent children and living 
alone 
(b) Single without dependent children and not 
living alone 
(c) Single with 1 dependent child 
(d) Single with 2 or more dependent children 
(e) Married without dependent children 
(f) Married with 1 or more dependent children 
8. For a married couple one of whom is in receipt of 
New Zealand Superannuation where the other is 
receiving sickness benefit 
9. For a married couple one of whom is in receipt of 
New Zealand Superannuation where the other is 
receiving invalid's benefit or a transitional 
retirement benefit 
10. For a married couple one of whom is in receipt 
of New Zealand Superannuation where the other is 
not receiving a benefit or is receiving 
unemployment benefit, job search allowance, or 
training benefit 
11 . For a married couple one of whom is receiving 
sickness benefit where the other is not receiving a 
benefit or is receiving unemployment benefit. job 
search allowance, or training benefit 
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$78.84 
$111 .86 
$145.05 
$159.75 
$78.84 
$111.86 
$145.05 
$159.75 
$204.08 
$196.78 
$111 .86 
$111 .86 
$145.05 
$159.75 
$204.08 
$196.78 
$162.07 
$188.27 
$130.57 
$149.50 
-
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Advance payment of benefits 
12. For a married couple one of whom is receiving 
sickness benefit where the other is receiving an 
invalid 's benefit or a transitional retirement benefit 
13. For a married couple one of whom is receiving 
domestic purposes benefit under section 27G of the 
Act (care of sick or infirm) where the other is not 
receiving a benefit or is rece iving unemployment 
benefit . iob search allowance. or training benefit 
14. For a married couple one of whom is receiving 
domestic purposes benefit under section 27G of the 
Act (care of sick or infirm) where the other is 
receiving a sickness benefit 
15. For a married couple one of whom is receiving 
domestic purposes benefit under section 27G of the 
Act (care of sick or infirm) where the other is 
receiving an invalid's benefit or a transitional 
ret irement benefit 
16. For a married person whose spouse is 
unlawfully in New Zealand 
[3008.1) History 
[3008.1] 
$177.88 
$146.38 
$177.88 
$204.08 
The standard 
costs that would 
otherwise apply 
to the applicant 
if he or she were 
unmarried 
In Part 111 : in the defini tion of ;;A llowable costs", paras (a) and (c) 
were substituted by a Direc tio n by the Mini ster of Soc ial W elfare 
dated 8 May I 995 . 
In the Sched ul e the co lumn head ing "Standard Income" was omitted 
and the heading "Standard Costs"' was substituted by a Directi on by the 
M inister of Soc ial W e lfa re dated 8 May 1995. 
In c l 4(c) of the Schedul e th e express io n " 135.15" was omitted and the 
ex press ion ·· J 36. 15" was substituted by a Direc ti on by the Mini ster of 
Soc ia l We lfa re dated 8 May 1995. 
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The following is reproduced from the explanatory note as reasons for 
the direction: 
The amendments to the definition of Allowable costs correct two 
errors in the previous direction where any accommodation 
supplement, rent rebate allowance, tenure protection allowance, 
and disability allowance were counted twice in the assessment, as 
they are also included in the definition of Chargeable income by 
virtue of being benefits payable under Part I of the Act. 
The amendments to the Schedule correct typographical errors. 
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SPECIAL BENEFIT DECISION SUMMARY 
1. Formula rate = 
$ _______ _ 
(amount shown on SWIFTT) 
2. Ensure the customer has recorded on the application all points th
at they want considered and 
you have discussed all these pointswith the customer. 
3. Does the customer's individual situation warrant a grant of SPB? 
4 . 
5. 
NO DECLINE APPLICATION 
YES 
Clearly record and advise the reasoning behind this decision 
DETAIL THE REASONING BELOW 
Have you decided to waive the $10.00 standard deduction? 
YIN 
If yes, why? ______________________
_____ _ 
Have you decided to ignore the 30% of allowable costs. upper limit? 
YIN 
If yes, why? ______________________
_____ _ 
Are there any other relevant factors in the customer's individual circumstance
s and 
commitments which would increase the amount payable? 
YIN 
If yes. why? ______________________
_____ _ 
6. Are there any other relevant factors in the customer's individual c
ircumstances which would 
decrease the amount payable? 
YIN 
If yes, why? ______________________
_____ _ 
DECISION: 
Application Granted 
Application Declined 
Reason for EITHER Decision 
:@ $ _____ pw 
Signed ______________ _ 
Checked 
from ______ _ 
Date _____ _ 
Date 
VICTORIA 
UNIVERSITY 
OF 
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Overdue Books. LIBRARY 
• , ": I If~-• ~ I ·-' 
1 
Folder 
McK 
McKinnon, Heather 
Ann 
NZISS and the 
exercise of 
discretion in 
special benefit 
assessment since 

